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Secondary Liability Under Section
10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934
Daniel R. Fischelt
Various common law doctrines have played a central role in the
development of a federal common law under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' and rule lOb-5. 2 The existence of an
implied private right of action for damages under section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5, for example, was originally predicated upon the tort law
maxim, Ubijus, ibi remedium-where there is a right, there is a remedy.3 Courts have similarly relied on criminal and tort common law
doctrines in imposing secondary liability4 on peripheral defendants
who do not themselves violate the express prohibition of a statute, but

who have some connection with the primary wrongdoer.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A. 1972, Cornell
University; J.D. 1977, University of Chicago.
The author wishes to thank Dean David S. Ruder and Professor Stephen Presser of Northwestern University School of Law, Professor Frank H. Easterbrook of the University of Chicago
Law School, and Professor Michael P. Dooley of the University of Virginia Law School for their
extremely helpful comments and suggestions. The views expressed herein, however, are solely
those of the author.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) reads in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for
any person, directly or indirectly, . . . (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security. .. any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance ......
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Rule lOb-5 provides in relevant part that it is unlawful:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
3. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
4. Secondary liability under the securities laws has two distinct meanings. First, the term is
used to describe the judicially implied civil liability which has been imposed on defendants who
have not themselves been held to have violated the express prohibition of the securities statute at
issue, but who have some relationship with the primary wrongdoer. Courts have imposed this
type of secondary liability on defendants who aid and abet, conspire with, or employ a defendant
who does violate the express prohibition of a statute. The focus of this Article is with this type of
secondary liability.
The second usage of the term secondary liability is the liability expressly imposed on "controlling persons" by § 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976), and § 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
The leading discussion of the scope of both types of secondary liability prior to the Supreme
Court's recent restrictive interpretations of the securities laws is Ruder, Multiple Defendants in
Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding andAbetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnjfcatlon, and
Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972).
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The United States Supreme Court has recently stated, however,
that reliance on tort law principles as a justification for implying a private right of action is entirely "misplaced" 5 because the "central inquiry" is "whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by
implication, a private cause of action."' 6 Emphasizing the importance
of statutory language and structure, and expressly disavowing the approach of earlier cases, the Court has rejected attempts to imply private
rights of action under various provisions of the securities laws.7
The emphasis on statutory language and structure in discerning
congressional intent is also evident in recent Supreme Court decisions
narrowing the substantive scope of the federal securities laws.' Thus,
the Court in recent years has repeatedly reversed lower courts which
have expansively interpreted the federal securities laws by glossing over
the operative words of statutory provisions.9
Despite this restrictive trend in the Supreme Court, lower courts,
relying on various common law doctrines, have continued to expansively interpret the scope of the securities laws in the area of secondary
liability without express statutory mandates for doing so.10 Every court
of appeals that has faced the issue, for example, has held that a defendant can be liable for "aiding and abetting" a violation by another defendant of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5,11 the provisions under which
the vast majority of secondary liability cases arise,' 2 even though the
literal language of section 10(b) contains no such prohibition. *Several
5. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979).
6. Id at 575. See also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979)
(the "dispositive question" is whether Congress intended to create a private remedy).
7. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co.
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). In these
cases the Court rejected the rationale of J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), where a
private remedy was implied to effectuate the remedial purposes of a statute. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16; 442 U.S. at 576-78. The Court has also rejected
the analysis in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), to the extent it permitted implication of a private
cause of action even though Congress did not intend such a result. 442 U.S. at 575-76. See also
444 U.S. at 23-24; notes 66-79 and accompanying text infra.
8. Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980); Chiarela v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462 (1977); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See also SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
9. E.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
10. See Part I infra.
11. E.g., Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 930 (1979); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), ceri. denied,439
U.S. 1039 (1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey,
493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
12. Secondary liability has also been imposed, however, under other provisions of the securities laws. See notes 35-38 and accompanying text infra.
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courts have similarly held that a defendant can be liable for "conspiring with" another defendant who violates the securities laws.I3 Finally,
numerous courts have held that employers of defendants who violate
the securities laws can themselves be liable under a respondeat superior theory. 14

As a result of the wholesale incorporation of these common law
doctrines into the federal securities laws, courts have increasingly held

that numerous types of defendants can be secondarily liable when they
have some connection with a defendant who has been found to have
violated an express prohibition of the securities laws. These defendants
have included banks,' 5 stock exchanges,' 6 accountants, 17 lawyers, '8 and

underwriters,' 9 as well as employers or supervising employees gener20
ally.
The thesis of this Article is that the theory of secondary liability is

no longer viable in light of recent Supreme Court decisions strictly interpreting the federal securities laws. These cases make clear that the

question of liability for all defendants must be determined by the language, structure, and legislative history of the relevant statutes. Since
lower courts have relied instead upon various common law doctrines to
impose liability upon defendants alleged to have aided and abetted,
conspired with, or employed so-called "primary" wrongdoers, their de-

cisions must now be reevaluated. When liability is determined by reference to the language and structure of securities statutes, far fewer
defendants will face liability under the federal securities laws.
Part I of this Article will examine the development of aiding and

abetting, conspiracy, and respondeat superior liability in the current
state of the law of section 10(b). Part II will demonstrate, using the
implied private right of action cases as an analogy, that tort and crimi13. E.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977
(1967); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
14. E.g., Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980).
Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980), cer. deniedsub nom. Wood Walkey &
Co. v. Marbury Mgmt., Inc., 149 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1980); Holloway v. Howerdd, 536
F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976).
15. E.g., Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978), cerl. denied,
439 U.S. 930 (1979); Rosen v. Dick [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 194,786
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
16. E.g., Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
17. E.g., Kestenbaum v. Emerson, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
197,330 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1980); H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
18. E.g., SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535
(2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
19. E.g., IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
20. E.g., Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980), cerl. denied sub nora.
Wood Walkey & Co. v. Marbury Mgmt., Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1980); Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Holloway v.
Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976).
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nal law doctrines should not serve as the basis for the imposition of
secondary liability. Part III will further demonstrate that when congressional intent, as measured by statutory language, structure, and history, is used as the touchstone for determining the scope of liability, the
imposition of secondary liability cannot be justified. Because aiding
and abetting, conspiracy, and respondeat superior should no longer be
recognized as valid theories of recovery, peripheral defendants in securities cases can be liable only if they engage in a "manipulative or
deceptive" practice within the meaning of section 10(b) or engage in
conduct that violates some other express statutory prohibition. Thus,
Part IV will analyze the appropriate limits of liability under section
10(b) and selected other provisions of the federal securities laws.
I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECONDARY LIABILITY AND THE

CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

Courts have imposed secondary liability based on a variety of theories, including aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and respondeat superior. The development of each of these doctrines is examined below.
A. Aiding andAbetting Liability
The leading case establishing aiding and abetting liability and, indeed, the leading secondary liability case in general is the district court
opinion in Brennan v. Midwestern UnitedLife Insurance Co.2 1 Because
the analysis in Brennan reveals a great deal about the common law,
nonstatutory basis of secondary liability, it is worthy of careful scrutiny.
The complaint in Brennan alleged that a defendant corporation,
Midwestern, was liable under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 for aiding
and abetting an alleged violation of these provisions by a broker,
Dobich, who engaged in a fraudulent scheme in the sale of Midwestern
stock. The complaint alleged that Midwestern was aware of Dobich's
activities, but failed to report the activities to the Indiana Securities
Commission or to the Securities and Exchange Commission. By permitting the fraudulent scheme to continue, the complaint alleged, Midand benefited by
western encouraged the continuation of the scheme
22
the artificial build-up of the market for its stock.
Midwestern attacked the sufficiency of the complaint, arguing, inter alia, that "there is nothing in the statute indicating a Congressional
21. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (motion to dismiss denied), 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D.
Ind. 1968) (on merits after trial), aj'd,417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989
(1970).
22. 259 F. Supp. at 675.
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intent to impose civil liability on persons aiding and abetting violations

of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5."'2 3 Midwestern also argued that the
relevant legislative history showed Congress chose not to prohibit aiding and abetting since it had declined to adopt amendments to the se-

curities laws explicitly making aiding and abetting actionable under
section 10(b). 24
The district court, although acknowledging that there was nothing
in the statute or its legislative history indicating a congressional intent
to impose aiding and abetting liability, nevertheless held that an aider
and abettor could be liable under the section and the rule. Relying
heavily upon section 876 of the Restatement of Torts, 25 the court stated
that "general principles of the law should continue to guide the development of federal common law remedies under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5."126 Implying liability for aiding and abetting based on common
law tort principles, in the court's view, was nothing more than a "logical and natural complement" 27 to the implication of a private right of
action under rule lOb-5, which was also developed from general principles of tort law.2 8 Having incorporated the tort law concept of aiding
and abetting liability into section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, the court declined to dismiss the complaint.
Brennan's underlying rationale was immediately followed by other
courts.2 9 These courts, also reasoning from the Restatement of Torts,
23. Id. at 680.
24. Id. at 677. See note 103 and accompanying text infra.
25. Section 876 of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS provides:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject
to liability if he. . . (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or (c)
gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own
conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939).
26. 259 F. Supp. at 680.
27. Id.
28. The court rejected the argument that aiding and abetting is not prohibited by § 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 because there is no evidence that Congress intended to prohibit such conduct by referring to the rejection of comparable arguments against implying a private right of action.
[D]efendant points out that there is nothing in the statute indicating a Congressional
intent to impose civil liability on persons aiding and abetting violations of Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. But, likewise, one can search the statute in vain for language indicating
that a violator of Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 should be liable in a civil action for
damages. Such liability was developed by the courts on general principles of tort law.
Judge Kirkpatrick in the Kardon case,. . . cited the Restatement, Torts § 286 (1939) in
finding civil liability for the violation of Section 10(b). Such liability was there rested
upon the maxim, Ubijus, ibi remedium-Where there is a right, there is a remedy. This
is the rationale upon which the Kardon doctrine has been adopted by the court of appeals. Appropriate general principles of law should continue to guide the development
of federal common law remedies under Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5.
Id. (citations omitted).
29. E.g., SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975);
Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973). See also lIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir.
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held that peripheral defendants who knew or should have known of a
fraud and rendered substantial assistance to the primary wrongdoer
could be liable as aiders and abettors.
B.

ConspiracyLiability

Relying upon the tort and criminal common law concept of conspiracy, a few lower courts have also held that peripheral defendants
could be liable under the securities laws if they "conspired" with the
primary violator.3" Indeed, the case in which an implied private right
of action under section 10(b) was first recognized, Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co.,3 involved a cause of action alleging conspiracy.
In Kardon, shareholders of a closely held company sold their
shares to certain other shareholders. These purchasing shareholders allegedly had previously entered into an agreement to resell these shares
to an unrelated corporation, National, at a higher price. The selling
shareholders then brought an action against the purchasing shareholders under rule 1Ob-5 for failure to disclose this alleged agreement to
resell at a higher price. National was joined as a defendant because it
allegedly "conspired" with the purchasing shareholders. The court
held that National could be liable as a conspirator if it knew of the
purchasing shareholders' intention not to disclose the agreement to resell.
One of the most common areas where liability has been imposed
under a conspiracy theory is in the sale of control cases. In Dasho v.
Susquehanna Corporation,32 for example, plaintiff shareholders alleged,
in a derivative action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, that the officers and directors had conspired to defraud the corporation in a
scheme in which insiders had sold control of the corporation to a second corporation which had subsequently merged into the first corporation. The court held that this merger constituted a sale of securities by
which the first corporation was defrauded. The court further held that
one director, Lauhoff, who was not involved in the merger since he sold
his stock and resigned as a director (allegedly in furtherance of the
fraudulent scheme), was nevertheless liable as a conspirator.3 3 Other
1980); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1979); Monsen v. Consolidated
Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1979); Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
30. E.g., Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977
(1967); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
31. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
32. 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967).
33. The court stated:
Lauhoff's sale of his stock and his resignation as a director were allegedly two of the
overt acts done by him in furtherance of the conspiracy. Thus, having allegedly joined
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courts have upheld allegations of conspiracy liability under similar circumstances.3 4
C. Respondeat Superior Liability
Section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 3 and section 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 193436 each impose liability on those "con-

trolling persons" who control the primary wrongdoer. Both sections,
however, provide a good faith defense to control person liability. 37 As
a general rule, this defense shields a person from liability if he can
show that he exercised reasonable internal supervision against securi-

ties violations.38
To preclude employers from relying upon this good faith defense,
plaintiffs have sued these defendants under section 10(b) using the the-

ory of respondeat superior. Under this common law doctrine, employers are strictly liable for the improper acts of their employees
committed within the scope of their employment.3 9 The statutory good
faith defense provided by sections 15 and 20(a), therefore, is unavailable to defendants in actions brought under a respondeat superior theory.
Employer defendants, to avoid strict liability under respondeat superior, have consistently argued that the controlling persons sections
with their good faith defense are the exclusive method of imposing liability on employers under the securities acts. While some courts have
accepted this argument,4 ° the majority of courts of appeals have held
that the controlling persons provisions do not preclude the imposition
the conspiracy and taken steps to assure its success, Lauhoffis responsible for the acts of
his co-conspirators in furtherance of said conspiracy.
Id. at 267 n.2.
34. E.g., Herpich v. Wilder, 430 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971);
Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976).
36. Id. § 78t.
37. Section 15 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976) provides that a controlling person
shall be liable "unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe
in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to
exist." Section 20(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976), similarly provides that a
controlling person shall be liable "unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action."
38. Eg., Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1134-35 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,423 U.S. 1025
(1975).
39. Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY

§ 257 (1958).

40. E.g., Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978); Rochez Bros., Inc. v.
Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Klapmeier v. Telecheck Int'l, Inc., 482 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1973).
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of respondeat superior liability, apparently through federal law.4
The recent Second Circuit case of Marbury Management, Inc. v.

Kohn42 is illustrative of this majority view. In Marbury, a brokerage
firm's employee committed a securities fraud on certain purchasers.
Plaintiffs sued the employee as well as the brokerage firm. The court
held that the brokerage firm could be liable, under both the controlling
person provision of section 20(a) and under respondeat superior. The

court rejected the exclusivity argument, stating that, "[T]here is no warrant for believing that Section 20(a) was intended to narrow the remedies of the customers of brokerage houses or to create a novel defense
4 3 Sevin cases otherwise governed by traditional agency principles."
eral provisions of the Restatement of Agency were cited by the court.'

Having held that respondeat superior liability is not precluded by the
controlling persons provisions, the court concluded that "the special

good faith defense afforded by the last clause of Section 20(a) is unavailable."4 5 By recognizing strict liability under respondeat superior,
the Second Circuit and other circuits which have adopted the same
view have effectively eliminated the good faith defense provided by the

statute.
D.

The Supreme Court and Secondary Liability

The Supreme Court has never faced the issue of whether secondary liability is a valid theory under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. The
Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,46 however, suggests
that the Court might not recognize any of the various forms of secondary liability as valid theories of recovery.
The Seventh Circuit, in Hochfelder, had held that an accounting
firm which had negligently failed to discover a fraud of the primary
41. See also Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1980).
Marbury Mgmt. Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. deniedsub nora. Wood Walker &
Co. v. Marbury Mgmt., Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1980); Holloway v. Howerdd, 536
F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976); Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1975); Bird v. Ferry, 497 F.2d 112
(5th Cir. 1974); Senott v. Rodman & Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,414 U.S. 926
(1973); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971). These other cases do not specifically state that they are relying upon federal law. Because there is no mention of any relevant
state law, however, nor any discussion of the exercise of pendent jurisdiction, these courts appear
to base their imposition of respondeat superior liability upon federal law.
42. 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nonm. Wood Walker & Co. v. Marbury
Mgmt., Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1980).
43. Id. at 716. The logical conclusion that follows from this statement is that § 20(a) does
not supplant respondeat superior liability under state law. The Marbury court, in contrast, like
the other courts that have imposed respondeat superior liability, based its holding on federal law.
See note 41 and accompanying text supra. It does not follow, however, that because Congress did
not intend to narrow the remedies available at common law, it meant to create a federal remedy
under § 10(b).
44. Id. The court cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 228, 229,257,258,261,262,
and 265 (1958).
45. 629 F.2d at 716.
46. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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wrongdoer could be liable as an aider and abettor.4 7 The Supreme
Court reversed, but based its holding on a need for scienter, 48 and did
not reach the question of whether a defendant could be liable for aiding and abetting. In an important footnote, however, the Court stated:
In view of our holding that an intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud is required for liability, under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, we
need not consider whether civil liability for aiding and abetting is appropriate under the section and the Rule ....
Although the Court expressly reserved the issue of whether aiding
and abetting is a proper theory under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, its
approach nevertheless casts some doubt on the continued viability of
aiding and abetting liability. The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh
Circuit's holding that the accounting firm was liable as an aider and
abettor because the plaintiff had failed to allege that it had acted with
scienter as required by the "manipulative or deceptive" language of
section 10(b). However, under a strict aiding and abetting analysis, it is
irrelevant whether an aider and abettor has engaged in a manipulative
or deceptive practice within the meaning of section 10(b). What is relevant is whether the primary violator engaged in such a practice. The
critical inquiry then would be whether the secondary defendant aided
and abetted in the commission of the violation. 0 By holding that the
accounting firm was not liable under the section and the rule because it
did not engage in a "manipulative or deceptive" practice, and by not
considering whether the accounting firm could otherwise be liable as an
aider and abettor, the Court implicitly held that aiding and abetting
liability does not exist apart from liability that could be imposed for a
direct violation.
While the Court in Hochfelder only questioned the soundness of
aiding and abetting liability, its analysis applies equally to conspiracy
and respondeat superior liability. These latter forms of secondary liability, like aiding and abetting, have been derived from common law
concepts rather than the language of section 10(b). More important, if
Hochfelder stands for the proposition that a defendant cannot be liable
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 unless he has engaged in a "manipulative or deceptive" practice within the meaning of section 10(b), the
current validity of all forms of secondary liability is, at the very least, in
doubt.
47. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), rep'd,425 U.S. 185 (1976).
48. The Court explicitly refused to decide whether reckless conduct was sufficient to satisfy
the scienter standard. 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
49. Id. at 191 n.7.
50. At common law, for example, a party could be liable for selling burglary tools to a
burglar even though he himself did not commit the actual burglary.
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II
THE USE OF TORT AND CRIMINAL LAW DOCTRINES AS A
BASIS FOR IMPOSING SECONDARY LIABILITY:

THE IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION
ANALOGY

The existence of implied remedies under the securities laws, like
the existence of secondary liability, arose from incorporation of common law doctrines into the federal securities laws.5 ' Indeed, the imposition of secondary liability based upon tort concepts was originally
justified by the comparable reliance on tort law in the creation of implied remedies. 2 The validity of relying on tort law as the basis for
implied private rights of action, therefore, is directly relevant to the
propriety of employing the same approach in the secondary liability
context.
A.

The Use of Tort Law andthe Implied Remedies Doctrine

The tort law origins of implied remedies under the securities laws
53
are clear. Kardon v. NationalGypsum Co., the case first establishing a
private right of action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, is illustrative.
There the court expressly relied upon section 286 of the Restatement of
Torts54 in rejecting the argument that Congress failure to provide an
express remedy when such remedies were provided for in other sections
demonstrated that Congress did not intend for one to exist. Although
the court conceded that the argument might be persuasive, "[w]ere the
whole question one of statutory interpretation," it concluded that the
existence of other express remedies was insufficient to manifest an intent "to deny a remedy and to wipe out a liability which, normally, by
virtue of basic principles of tort law accompanies the doing of the pro55
hibited act."1
The court in Kardon, therefore, did not find that Congress intended to create a private remedy in section 10(b). Indeed, the court's
concession suggests that had it viewed the inquiry as resting solely
51. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See notes 53-55 and
accompanying text infra.
52. See note 28 supra.
53. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
54. Id. at 513. Section 286 provides in part that:
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to do a
required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another if:(a) the

intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the other as an
individual; and (b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect
RFSTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934).
55. 69 F. Supp. at 514. This is the same reasoning that the Supreme Court used in first
implying a private remedy. See Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).

HeinOnline -- 69 Cal. L. Rev. 89 1981

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:80

upon whether Congress intended to create such a remedy, it would
have reached the opposite conclusion. Only by reliance upon tort law
principles, rather than congressional intent, did the court imply a private remedy under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
B.

The Supreme Court's Shfit Awayfrom Tort Law as a Basis/or
Implying PrivateRemedies in Securities Cases.From Borak to Piper

Although numerous lower courts adopted the tort law rationale of
Kardon as a basis for implying private remedies, 5 6 the Supreme Court
has followed a different approach. In JL Case Co. v. Borak, 7 the
Court held that an implied private right of action existed under section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. 8 The Court reasoned that since
"[p]rivate enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission action,"5 9 a private remedy was necessary to enforce the statutory scheme.
The enforcement rationale of Borak was narrowed in Cort v.
Ash, 60 where no implied private right of action was found under a federal election statute. 6' The Court established a four part test for determining whether to imply a private right of action: (1) whether the
plaintiff is part of a class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2)
whether there is any relevant legislative intent; (3) whether the implication of a remedy is consistent with the legislative scheme; and (4)
whether the cause of action is traditionally relegated to state law. 62 Applying this test, the Court in Pioer v. Chris-CraftIndustries,Inc. 63 held
that a defeated tender bidder cannot maintain a damage action against
the successful bidder or the target under section 14(e) of the Williams
Act.64
Neither Borak nor Cort, therefore, applied the tort law rationale
of Kardon. The analysis in these cases, however, suffers from the same
defect. Both the enforcement rationale of Borak and the four part test
56. Eg., Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. 111.1967) (implication of
private remedy under Commodity Exchange Act); Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014
(D. Mass. 1949) (implication of private remedy under § 7 of the Securities Exchange Act).
57. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
58. Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976) makes it unlawful for management or others to obtain authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate
disclosure in proxy solicitations.
59. 377 U.S. at 432.
60. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) (repealed 1976). The statute made it a criminal penalty for corporations to make political contributions under certain circumstances.
62. 422 U.S. at 78.
63. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
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in Cort and Piper, like the tort rationale of Kardon, allow courts to
imply private rights of action without any finding that Congress intended to confer such a remedy. Consequently, these cases invite
courts to engage in judicial lawmaking and create federal statutory
remedies even where Congress may never have intended that such remedies exist.6 5
C. The Rejection of Tort Law as a Basisfor Implying Private
Remedies in Securities Cases: Touche
Ross and Transamerica
Recent Supreme Court decisions have severely limited the availability of implied private damage remedies in securities cases. While the
Court has repeatedly recognized 6 6 that there is an implied remedy
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, it nevertheless has repudiated the
rationale of the Kardon case. Thus, the Court in Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington67 dismissed arguments to imply a private right of action
under section 17(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 193468 based
upon tort principles as "entirely misplaced." 6 9 Rather, the Court
stated, the question "of the existence of a statutory cause of action is
. . . one of statutory construction. ' 7° The Court further emphasized
that simply because a federal statute has been violated and a person
injured does not automatically mean a private right of action will be
conferred in favor of that person. 7 1 "The ultimate question," stated the
Court, "is one of Congressional intent, not one of whether this Court
thinks it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted
72
into law."
The emphasis on statutory construction in determining the existence of an implied remedy is also evident in TransamericaMortgage
Advisors v. Lewis. 73 There the Court stated that what must be ascertained "is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy as65. This point was made in Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 740-41 (1979).
66. The Court, while never facing the issue directly, has stated that the existence of an implied private right of action under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 is "well established." Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976). See also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
67. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).

68.

15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).

69. 442 U.S. at 568.
70. Id.
71. Id. The Court expressly narrowed Borak and Cori to the extent they suggested that a
private remedy could be implied to further the remedial purposes of a statute even though such
remedy was not intended by Congress. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
72. 442 U.S. at 578.
73. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
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serted" and not "the desirability of implying private rights of action in

order to provide remedies thought to effectuate the purposes of a given

statute."7 4 Since the statutory scheme at issue 75 did not indicate a congressional intent to create a private damage remedy, the Court held
that none could be implied.7 6
Under the rationale of Touche Ross and Transamerica,Kardon
was wrongly decided. The implication of a private right of action
under section 10(b) is not authorized by the language of that section,
nor suggested by the structure of the securities acts of the legislative
history of section 10(b). Moreover, the existence of an express private

right of action in other sections of the securities acts,7 7 but not in section 10(b), strongly suggests that Congress did not intend that one exist
to redress a violation of section 10(b). Since there is no evidence to
suggest that Congress intended to create a private remedy under section
10(b), Touche Ross and Transamericaindicate that none should have

been implied by the courts.7" Indeed, the focus on statutory language
and structure in these cases as the method for determining congres-

sional intent suggests that only in the rarest of circumstances should
courts imply a private remedy under any provision of the securities
laws where Congress has failed to create an express remedy.7 9
74. Id. at 15-16.
75. The main question in Transamerica was whether a private damage remedy could be
implied under § 201 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I - 80b-21 (1976).
76. The Court did hold, however, that § 215 of the Act, which provides that contracts in
violation of the Act "shall be void," allows injured persons to bring an equitable action to void an
investment adviser's contract in violation of the statute. 444 U.S. at 18-19. The Court also reaffirmed that the analogous § 29(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976), confers a right to
rescind a contract void under the criteria of that statute. Id.
77. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(1976); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 §§ 9(e), 16(b), 18(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78p(b), 78r (1976).
78. For an excellent exposition of the view that Congress did not intend to create a private
remedy, see Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: JudicialRevision of Legisladve Intent?, 57
Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963). The Court, however, appears to be unwilling to repudiate the wellsettled case law holding that there is an implied private remedy under § 10(b) and rule lob-5. See
note 66 supra.
79. In a major recent decision, however, a divided Second Circuit, in an opinion written by
Judge Friendly, has held that there is an implied damage remedy under the Commodity Exchange
Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24, (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Leist v. Simplot, Nos. 79-7402, 79-7464, 79-7482
(2d Cir. July 8, 1980) (slip op.). The court did not, however, embrace either the tort law rationale
of Kardon or the enforcement rationale of Borak as a basis for implying a private remedy. On the
contrary, the court recognized that recent Supreme Court decisions make clear that "the ultimate
touchstone is congressional intent and not judicial notions of what would constitute wise policy."
Leist v. Simplot, Nos. 79-7402, 79-7464, 79-7482 (2d Cir. July 8, 1980), slip op. at 4092. The court
reasoned that since Congress knew of the line of cases implying a private remedy under the Commodities Exchange Act when the Act was extensively amended in 1974 and did nothing to alter
the status quo, Congress must have intended that a private remedy exist. Id. at 4080-88, 4095.
Judge Mansfield dissented. In his view, the failure of the legislative history to demonstrate
that Congress affirmatively approved of these cases, as opposed merely to being aware of them,
precluded the implication of a private damage remedy. Id. at 4109-11. (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
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Current Validity of the Use of Tort and CriminalLaw as the Basis

for Imposing Secondary Liability
The tort law rationale of Kardon has been expressly followed by
courts imposing secondary liability based upon tort law principles.8 0
However, if the dispositive question in determining whether to imply a
private remedy is whether Congress intended to create such a remedy,
regardless of tort law principles, congressional intent must be equally
dispositive in the secondary liability context.
In fact, the case for focusing solely upon congressional intent in
analyzing secondary liability, and not upon tort law or any other common law doctrine, is even more compelling than in the implied remedies context. Implying a private remedy to redress violations of a
statute requires recognition of a cause of action even though none has
been expressly created by Congress. The conduct of the defendant,
however, has been expressly prohibited by Congress. The question of
secondary liability, in contrast, involves expanding the scope of prohibited conduct under a statute. If tort law cannot provide a basis for
implying a remedy, it necessarily follows that it cannot, without more,
be used to redefine the scope of conduct prohibited by a statute.8' The
Judge Mansfield also emphasized the complex remedial structure, which includes reparations provisions, to buttress his argument that Congress did not intend to create a private remedy. Id. at
4109 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
Both the majority and dissenting opinions, therefore, focus on congressional intent. The dissenting opinion, however, is more consistent with Touche Ross and Transamerica. These cases
hold that a court may imply a private remedy only if there is affirmative evidence that Congress
intended that such a remedy exist. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 667 (1979). No
such evidence was cited in Judge Friendly's majority opinion. Moreover, the complex remedial
provisions of the Act demonstrate that Congress was sensitive to the need for protecting investors
but nevertheless failed to enact an express remedy. Even if the majority opinion, which purports
to rely on congressional intent, is correct, however, it lends no support to the concept of secondary
liability which is not based upon congressional intent but rather upon various common law doctrines.
The Sixth Circuit has also recently held that there is an implied damage remedy under the
Commodity Exchange Act. Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216
(6th Cir. 1980). Some district courts, however, have reached the opposite conclusion. E.g., Gonzales v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Fischer v.
Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
80. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind.
1966), aft'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
81. Tort law, or other common law doctrines, can be relied upon to define the scope of
prohibited conduct under a statute if it appears from the language, structure, and legislative history that the statutory prohibition is coextensive with a prohibition at common law. If, for example, § 10(b) expressly prohibited aiding and abetting a violation by another defendant, the scope
of aiding and abetting liability at common law would be relevant in determining the scope of
liability under the statute. See, ag., SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 192-95 (1963)
(common law of fraud supportive of language and legislative history of antifraud statute). The
Court has also occasionally referred to the common law where "neither the legislative history nor
the statute itself affords specific guidance." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1979).
There the Court relied heavily upon the scope of the duty to disclose at common law to define
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scope of such prohibited conduct must be determined solely by reference to congressional intent.
III
SECONDARY LIABILITY AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

Since courts have uniformly relied upon common law doctrines in
imposing secondary liability, no attempt has been made to justify secondary liability by reference to the language of section 10(b), the statu-

tory framework, or relevant legislative history. Yet, it is precisely these
tools of statutory construction-and not reliance upon common law
doctrines-which the Supreme Court has repeatedly utilized to restrict

the substantive scope of section 10(b), as well as to limit the situations
in which a private right of action can be judicially implied.8 2 The propriety of imposing secondary liability must be evaluated under this new
methodology.
A.

The Language of the Statute

Section 10(b) provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly . . . [tlo use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive
practice . . . ." It does not expressly provide that it shall also be unlawful to aid and abet, conspire with, or employ a person who is liable
under the statute.8 3 Under the rationale of recent Supreme Court cases,
when a failure to disclose constitutes a "manipulative or deceptive" practice within the meaning of
§ 10(b). Since the legislative purpose was to prevent fraud, and the failure to disclose constituted
a fraud at common law only in certain circumstances, reliance on the common law in Chiarella
was necessary in order to determine congressional intent as to those circumstances. Id. at 114-15.
Reliance on the common law in Chiarella,therefore, was necessary to flesh out the scope of prohibited conduct under the "manipulative or deceptive" practice language of § 10(b). It lends no
support to the analysis in secondary liability cases where conduct has been prohibited under various common law doctrines without regard to whether such conduct was prohibited by the statute.
The Court has also held, however, that if the language, structure, and legislative history of a
statute demonstrate a congressional intent not to adopt the standard of liability at common law,
the common law cannot be used to define the scope of prohibited conduct. See Aaron v. SEC, 100
S. Ct. 1945 (1980) (scope of prohibited conduct under antifraud securities defined by language,
structure, and legislative history of statute, and not by the common law of fraud).
82. See cases cited in notes 7-8 supra.
83. It could conceivably be argued that the "directly or indirectly" language in § 10(b) might
provide some statutory basis for the imposition of liability on aiders and abettors, conspirators,
and employers of primary wrongdoers. Courts, however, have not imposed such liability on this
basis but rather have relied on various common law doctrines as the basis for secondary liability.
See Part I supra.
In any event, there is no support for the proposition that Congress intended the "directly or
indirectly" language to encompass secondary liability. The statutory scheme suggests the opposite. For instance, Congress specifically enacted § 20(a) of the 1934 Act which expressly imposes
liability on controlling persons. This provision would be surplusage in § 10(b) cases if the "directly or indirectly" language encompassed secondary liability. This provision, and the comparable § 15 of the 1933 Act, demonstrate that when Congress intended to impose secondary liability,
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this failure of section 10(b) or other provisions expressly to impose
these forms of secondary liability is strong evidence that Congress did
not intend to impose such liability upon conduct which would not
otherwise be prohibited as a "manipulative or deceptive practice."84
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that in deciding whether a
complaint states a cause of action under rule 1Ob-5, it is necessary to
"turn first to the language of § 10(b)," for "[tihe starting point in every
case involving construction of a statute is the language itself."8 5 The
Court has not hesitated to interpret restrictively the securities laws
where the cause of action asserted was broader than the relevant statutory language.
In Blue Cho Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,86 for example, the
question was whether offerees of an allegedly misleading stock offering
who never had purchased or sold any of the offering shares satisfied the
"purchase or sale" requirement of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. The
Court emphasized that the statute prohibited manipulative or deceptive
practices only "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" 7 and not in connection with any attempt to purchase or sell any
security.8" The Court thus held that the plaintiff failed to state a cause
of action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
The statutory language of section 10(b) was also held to be controlling in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 9 There the question was
whether a defendant who was only alleged to be negligent could be
civilly liable for employing a "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" as required by the language of section 10(b). The Court held
that a defendant who was only negligent could not be liable because
it did so expressly. In light of this statutory scheme, the "directly or indirectly" language cannot
be interpreted to encompass secondary liability.
One plausible interpretation of the "direct or indirectly" language is that it allows liability to
be imposed upon a defendant even though such defendant does not himself use the jurisdictional
means (ie., mail a letter in interstate commerce). See 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lob-5
§ 3.02(f) n.33 (rev. ed. 1980).
84. For an analysis of which forms of secondary liability constitute "manipulative or deceptive" practices, see Part IV infra.
Although the language of rule lob-S is somewhat broader than the language of§ 10(b), compare note I with note 2 supra, the Court has made it clear that the language of § 10(b) is controlling because the scope of an administrative rule promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission cannot be broader than the scope of the statute upon which it is based. Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,472-73 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 21314 (1976).
85. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976). See also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756
(1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
86. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
87. Id.at 732.
88. id.at 756 (Powell, J., concurring).
89. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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the words "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance" "make unmistakeable a congressional intent to proscribe a type of conduct quite difTo impose liability for negligence,
ferent from negligence."9
therefore, would "add a gloss to the operative language of the statute
quite different from its commonly accepted meaning." 91
This same emphasis on the statutory language is also evident in
Santa Fe Industries,Inc. v. Green.92 Plaintiff in that case alleged that a
merger which resulted in elimination of minority shareholders violated
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 even though full disclosure was made.
The Court, following the analysis in Hochfelder, held that no cause of
action was stated because "[t]he language of § 10(b) gives no indication
that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception." 93 Thus, in Blue Chio, Hochfelder and SantaFe, the
Supreme Court rejected section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 claims because the
conduct attacked was not prohibited by the statute. This same principle is applicable with respect to secondary liability. Not only has Congress failed expressly to prohibit aiding and abetting, conspiracy, or
employing a wrongdoer, but the statutory language, as interpreted by
the Supreme Court, suggests that no such prohibitions were intended.
Thus, the imposition of strict liability on employers under a respondeat
superior theory is flatly inconsistent with the holding of Hochfelder that
the "manipulative or deceptive" language in section 10(b) requires
proof of scienter as a prerequisite for liability. Similarly, the imposition of aiding and abetting or conspiracy liability on defendants who
themselves do not engage in any deceptive conduct is inconsistent with
the holding of Santa Fe that section 10(b) prohibits only such deceptive
conduct.94
B.

The Statutory Framework

Congress has expressly imposed secondary liability in several provisions of the securities laws, but not in section 10(b). Both section 15
of the 1933 Act and section 20(a) of the 1934 Act impose liability on
90. Id. at 199.
91. Id. Lower courts after Hochfelder, however, have continued to assume that aiding and
abetting a violation by another defendant is prohibited by § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. E.g., I1T v.
Cormfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); Edward J.Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588 (10th Cir.
1979); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 930 (1979); Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,439 US.
1039 (1978). The debate has focused only on how the scienter requirement established in
Hochfelder should be applied in aiding and abetting cases. Comparethe majority and dissenting

opinions in Rof.
92.
93.

430 U.S. 462 (1977).
Id. at 473.

94. For an analysis of which forms of secondary liability involve deceptive conduct, see Part
IV infira.
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"controlling persons" provided they do not act in good faith.9 5 Moreover, other provisions of the 1934 Act also deal with secondary liability.
Section 15(b)(4)(E),9 6 for example, gives the Commission the power to
censure or place other limitations on any person associated with a broker-dealer for willfully aiding and abetting or otherwise inducing a securities violation by another defendant.9 7
Under the reasoning in Blue Chip and Hochfelder, Congress provision of secondary liability in some sections of the securities laws but not
in section 10(b) is highly significant. In Blue Chip, the question was
whether a plaintiff who had never actually purchased or sold securities
could fall within the "purchase or sale" requirements of section 10(b).
The Court supported its holding that such a plaintiff could not bring an
action under section 10(b) by reference to the language in other provisions of the securities laws which does address fraud "in the offer or
sale" of securities. 98 "When Congress wished to provide a remedy to
those who neither purchase nor sell securities," the Court concluded,
"it had little trouble in doing so expressly." 99
The Court in Hochfelder similarly relied upon various provisions
of the federal securities laws in rejecting the Securities and Exchange
Commission's argument that negligence should suffice for civil liability
because section 10(b) is not explicitly limited to willful conduct. The
Court emphasized that the express recognition of causes of action premised on negligent conduct in other provisions of the Acts "stands in
sharp contrast to the language of section 10(b)" and, therefore, "significantly undercuts" the Commission's argument that such conduct is prohibited by the second."°
The rationale of Blue Chp and Hochfelder is directly applicable in
the secondary liability context. The express imposition of secondary
liability in the controlling persons sections and in other securities statutes demonstrates that when Congress intended to impose such liability, "it had little trouble in doing so expressly." Moreover, when
Congress did impose such liability, it only did so under certain conditions. A defendant cannot be liable under the controlling persons provisions if he acted in good faith. However, the imposition of
respondeat superior liability under section 10(b), such as in Marbury, 10 1deprives controlling persons who are not acting as principals of
95. See note 37 supra.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1976).
97. The 1934 Act also imposes duties of supervision on various entities. E.g., § 6, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78f (1976) (exchanges); § 17A(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1976) (clearing agencies).
98. 421 U.S. at 733-36.
99. Id. at 734.
100. 425 U.S. at 208.
101. 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980); see text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
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this good faith defense, and thereby disrupts the statutory scheme established by Congress.
C. Legislative History
Where the language of a statute is sufficiently clear-and the fail-

ure of Congress expressly to prohibit aiding and abetting, conspiring
with, or employing a primary violator when contrasted with the controlling person restrictions could not be clearer-such language is dispositive without resort to legislative history. 02 Even if legislative
history were relevant, however, there is no evidence in the legislative

history of section 10(b) that Congress ever intended to prohibit aiding
and abetting or conspiring with a primary violator. 0 3 With respect to

respondeat superior liability, Congress specifically chose not to impose
such liability on employers.
As originally promulgated, section 15 of the 1933 Act imposed
strict liability on controlling persons without regard to whether such
control was exercised to bring about the securities violation.

strong opposition from the business community,

05

°4

After

however, Congress

decided to "liberalize" the provision. °" Section 15 was amended to
provide that a controlling person would be liable "unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the

existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled
102. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. at 201.
103. Congress has, however, specifically rejected several attempts to amend the securities laws
expressly to prohibit aiding and abetting a violation of § 10(b). H.R. 5001 and S. 1178, 86th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1959) would have made it unlawful "for any person to aid, abet, counsel, command, induce or procure the violation of any provision of [the 1933 Act]." SecuritiesActsAmendments, 1959, Hearings on H.A 5001 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce,86th Cong., 1st Sess. 89, 103 (1959). Because of industry fears that the amendment might have resulted in aiders and abettors being liable for damages, the Securities and Exchange Commission agreed that the bill should be clarified to indicate that "no civil liability is
intended." SEC Legislation: Hearingson S. 1178-1182 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Bankingand Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 288 (1959). Language subjecting aiders and abettors to injunctions was reintroduced in 1960 as S. 3770. None of these bills was ever enacted.
104. H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1933).
105. The original version of § 15 raised numerous complaints from the business community,
which felt it was "too drastic, and interfered with business." 78 CONG. REC. 8668 (1934) (remarks
of Senator Fletcher).
106. Id. The intent of the proposed amendment to § 15 was "to restrict the scope of the
section so as more accurately to carry out its real purpose." Id. at 8669 (1934) (Memorandum
Explanatory of Suggested Amendments to the Securities Act). See also id. at 10260, 10265 (1934)
(Statement of House Conferees). Accordingly, "[t]he mere existence of control [was] not made a
basis for liability if it is shown that the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable
ground to believe in the existence of the facts upon which the liability of the controlled person
[was] alleged to [have been] based." I1d.
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person is alleged to exist."" °7 By enacting this version of section 15,
Congress rejected the earlier strict liability version. Since the subsequently enacted version of section 20 of the 1934 Act similarly contains
a good faith defense, 0 8 it also constitutes a rejection of the strict liability standard.
Those courts which have held employers strictly liable under a respondeat superior theory as a matter of federal law, therefore, have
acted contrary to the legislative intent of Congress. Since such a result
is inconsistent with the most basic canons of statutory construction, it
necessarily follows that employers should be liable under the federal
securities laws for the acts of their employees only if they fall within the
statutory definition of a controlling person who does not act in good
faith as provided in sections 15 and 20.
D.

The Case of SEC Enforcement Actions

To enjoin a violation of section 10(b) in an enforcement proceeding, the Commission, like a private litigant, must establish that the defendant engaged in a "manipulative or deceptive" practice."0 9 Since
the language of section 10(b), the statutory structure, and the relevant
legislative history do not indicate any congressional intent to impose
secondary liability, there should be no difference between an SEC enforcement action and an implied private right of action for damages.
Secondary liability should not be recognized in either type of action.
The analysis is made somewhat more complicated, however, by a
provision in the Criminal Code" 0 which provides that any person who
aids and abets or otherwise assists in the commission of a crime against
the United States is punishable as a principal. A person who aids and
abets in the commission of a securities violation, therefore, can be criminally liable under this provision because a violation of a securities statute is an offense against the United States. Based upon this provision
in the Criminal Code at least one court has held that because of the
similarity between an SEC enforcement proceeding and a criminal action, "no good reason" exists why the SEC should not be able to enjoin
the aiding and abetting of a securities violation."'
107.

15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976), asamendedby Act of June 6,1934, Pub. L. No. 93-291, § 208,48

Stat. 908.
108. See note 37 supra.
109. The Supreme Court has tended not to distinguish between private damage actions and
SEC enforcement proceedings in interpreting the "manipulative or deceptive" practice language.
See Aaron v. SEC, 100 S.Ct. 1945 (1980) (scienter required in both private damage actions and
SEC injunctive actions).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
111. In SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939), a Commission enforcement
proceeding, the court relied upon 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), which provides that whoever aids and
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While the analogy between a criminal prosecution and an SEC
enforcement proceeding has a certain superficial appeal, 2 it ultimately
is not persuasive. The existence of criminal prohibitions against a form
of conduct does not necessarily mean that there should be civil prohibitions under a different federal statute for the same conduct. The ultimate question is whether Congress intended that there be such civil
prohibitions.
Congress is perfectly free to decide, for example, that because both
an SEC enforcement proceeding and a criminal prosecution are
brought by the government to serve the public interest, aiding and
abetting should be actionable under both types of actions. There is no
evidence, however, that Congress has made such a decision. When
Congress intended to provide the SEC with power to regulate aiding
and abetting, it did so expressly. Thus, section 15(b)(4)(E) of the 1934
Act"13 as amended expressly authorizes the Commission to censure any
broker or dealer, or any person associated with a broker or dealer, who
"has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced or procured the violation by any other person of any provision [of the securities laws].""' 4 Section 21(d) of the 1934 Act," 5 the section that
authorizes the SEC to seek injunctive relief, however, contains no such
language. Since Congress apparently did not intend that the SEC have
the power to enjoin aiding and abetting under section 21(d), such a
remedy should not be implied from the existence of a criminal remedy
for the same conduct under a different statute.
E.

The Relevance of Policy Arguments

It could be argued that effective enforcement of the securities laws
requires that liability in securities cases be imposed on peripheral deabets in the commission of an offense against the United States is punishable as a principal, to
justify enjoining such secondary conduct. The court reasoned:
The present suit, seeking injunctive relief, sounds in fraud, and is similar in many
respects to a criminal prosecution. The Criminal Code of the United States provides that
whoever aids or abets in the commission of an offense is a principal. Persons charged
with aiding and abetting a criminal offense in violation of Sec. 17(a) may be joined as
defendants, and no good reason appears why this same rule should not apply in an
injunctive proceeding to restrain a violation of the same statute.
28 F. Supp. at 43 (footnotes omitted).
112. The analogy is far from perfect. Criminal actions involve a panoply of procedural pro-

tections, such as the right to jury trial, the right to counsel, and the right to be convicted only upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which are absent in an SEC enforcement proceeding. The level
of scienter necessary to hold a defendant liable under a criminal prosecution may also be significantly higher than in a civil action. Compare Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949)
(scienter for criminal aiding and abetting) with Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)
(scienter necessary in civil action).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1976).
114. Id.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1976).
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fendants who provide some assistance to the primary wrongdoer or
who are in a position to prevent the wrongdoing. Section 10(b) and
be construed flexibly so as to imrule lOb-5, the argument runs, must
16
purposes.1
remedial
their
plement
The problem with this argument is that it subsumes far too much.
Indeed, it is no more than a restatement of the enforcement rationale of
Borak, which was narrowed in Cort v. Ash and expressly rejected in
Touche Ross and Transamericaas a basis for implying a private right
of action. "7 The Court has also rejected the enforcement rationale as a
basis for construing the substantive scope of the securities laws more
broadly than their language and structure would reasonably permit.
As the Court stated in Aaron v. SEC,
"[G]eneralized references to the 'remedial purposes'" of the securities
laws "will not justify reading a provision 'more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit'.". . . Thus, if the
language of a provision of the securities laws is sufficiently clear in its
context and not at odds with the legislative history, it is unnecessary "to
have
examine the additional considerations of 'policy' . . . that may
' 18
influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the statute." "

In any event, the relevant policy arguments do not all point in one
direction. For one thing, the threat of secondary liability affects defendants who are not engaged in the purchase or sale of securities. In
most cases, the defendant who is alleged to be secondarily liable will
merely be engaged in customary business activities such as lending
money, managing a corporation, supervising employees, preparing
financial statements, or giving legal advice.' 19 It is all too easy for a
clever plaintiff's lawyer, looking for a deep pocket, to allege that indi116. The district court opinion in Brennan relied on precisely this argument in holding that a
defendant could be liable for aiding and abetting even though the statutes contain no such express
prohibition. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 681 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
See also notes 21-28 and accompanying text supra.
117. As one court has stated, the Supreme Court has "rejected any reliance upon the desiraGateway Indus., Inc. v. Agency Rent A Car,
bility of inferring a private right of action.
1980).
Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92, 96 (N.D. Ill.
118. 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1955 (1980) (citations omitted).
A different case would be presented if Congress, in enacting or in reenacting the Securities
Exchange Act, had been aware of a particular judicial or administrative construction which it
intended to adopt. E.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978). A different case might even be
presented if Congress reenacted § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act without commenting on an
established judicial construction. Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Leist v. Simplot, Nos. 79-7402, 79-7464, 79-7482 (2d Cir. July 8, 1980). See note 79 supra. But cf.SEC v.
Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978) (Congress not presumed to approve longstanding administrative interpretation). In the secondary liability context, none of the above possibilities are presented because
there has been no reenactment of §10(b) where Congress could be said to either have approved of,
or even acquiesced to, the various forms of secondary liability. See note 103 and accompanying
text supra.
119. See Ruder, supra note 4, at 632.
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viduals performing these functions knew or, but for their recklessness,

would have known of the fraudulent conduct of the primary defendant
but nevertheless lent assistance to the scheme. Even if such a claim

120
cannot be proved at trial, it may have significant settlement value.
In the event that the claim is meritorious, the plaintiff would not necessarily be left without a remedy under the approach proposed in this

Article, but rather would have to look to state law in order to recover.
IV
THE PROPER RANGE OF LIABILITY UNDER SECTION

10(b)

Under the analysis proposed in this Article, defendants can no
longer be held liable in a civil action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5

on aiding and abetting, conspiracy, or respondeat superior theories.
Such defendants can be held liable, if at all, only if they have engaged

in a "manipulative or deceptive practice" prohibited by section
10(b). 121 Recent decisions make clear that in order to fall within this

statutory prohibition, a defendant, acting with scienter,122 must make a
material misrepresentation or wrongfully fail to disclose despite a
fiduciary duty to do so' 23 in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security, or engage in a manipulative practice designed to mislead in120. The Supreme Court has recognized that "litigation under Rule lOb-5 presents a danger
of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general" and that "even a complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of
success at trial has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect of
success at trial ....
" Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-40 (1975).
121. It is not enough that a defendant engages in conduct that arguably "operates as a fraud"
or otherwise violates the language of rule lOb-5. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the
scope of the rule can be no broader than the range of prohibited conduct under the "manipulative
or deceptive" language of § 10(b). See note 84 supra.
122. The scienter requirement was established in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976), and extended to SEC injunctive actions in Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980).
123. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). A duty to disclose under the antifraud provisions has most frequently been implied where a party trades on inside information. If
a party does not trade on inside information, no duty to disclose has been imposed. The most
famous exposition of the disclose-or-refrain-from-trading rule is found in Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907 (1961). The disclose-or-refrain-from-trading rule, and the persons against whom that
rule is applicable, are discussed in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See also note
81 supra.
A duty to disclose to customers has also occasionally been imposed on broker-dealers in
certain situations. E.g., Sutton v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(failure of brokerage house to disclose customer complaints actionable under § 10(b) and rule
lob-5). One possible basis for this duty to disclose imposed on broker-dealers is the so-called
"shingle theory." The "shingle theory" provides, in essence, that a broker or dealer who hangs out
his shingle impliedly represents that he will deal fairly with the public. The theory can be utilized
to prohibit a wide range of broker-dealer abuses including the sale of securities at a price not
reasonably related to market value, the effecting of unauthorized transactions, or the recommendation of unsuitable investments without full disclosure. See generally L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1482-93 (2d ed. 1961). The Supreme Court has never had occasion to consider the
"shingle theory," and the precise limits of the doctrine are unclear.
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vestors by artificially affecting market activity. 124
The abolition of secondary liability will not make all cases easy to
decide. Frequently the line between primary and secondary liability is
blurred, and the resolution of the question of whether a peripheral defendant in a securities case has violated the express prohibition of a
statute will be difficult. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some general observations on the potential liability of groups of defendants who
have traditionally been held liable on aiding and abetting, conspiracy,
or respondeat superior theories.
A.

Defendants Who Fail to "Blow the Whistle" on
Primary Wrongdoers

Defendants who fail to report or disclose primary violations committed by others have been held to have acted as aiders and abettors.125
This "whistle blowing" theory of liability does not survive the abolition
of secondary liability proposed in this Article.
The first suggestion that the failure to report fraud to regulatory
authorities could constitute aiding and abetting is found in the original
district court opinion in Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance
Co.' 2 6 There plaintiff claimed that defendant, a life insurance company, was liable under the federal securities laws for aiding and abetting a rule 10b-5 violation by a brokerage firm in connection with the
sale of shares of the defendant life insurance company's stock. The
insurance company itself was not accused of engaging in manipulative
or deceptive practices. Rather, the complaint alleged that it was liable
as an aider and abettor because it knew of the fraud being committed
by the brokerage firm but failed to report it to the state securities commission or to the Securities Exchange Commission. Based on these allegations, the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
27
was denied, and it was eventually held liable as an aider and abettor.
124. The Court has stated that the prohibition against "manipulative" practices in § 10(b) is
"virtually a term of art" which "refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders,
or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity."
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977). See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
125. E.g., SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (motion to dismiss),
286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968) (after trial), aff'd, 417 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,397

U.S. 989 (1970).
126. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
127. While the court of appeals affirmed the district court in Brennan, it refused to decide
whether the failure to report the fraud to regulatory authorities was sufficient to impose aiding and
abetting liability. 417 F.2d at 155. The court stated that Midwestern also engaged in "affirmative
acts" to further the fraud, and these acts, coupled with the failure to report the fraud, were sufficient for aiding and abetting liability. Id. at 154. The "affirmative acts" by Midwestern relied
upon by the court, however, consisted of referring complaints by stockholders to the broker and
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The Securities and Exchange Commission in recent years has also
attempted to expand greatly the duty of accountants and lawyers to
disclose fraud to the investing public and to report fraud to the Commission.128 In its well-known complaint in the NationalStudent Marketing case, 12 9 for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission
alleged that accountants and lawyers acted as aiders and abettors under
section 10(b) because they failed to take adequate steps to disclose a

securities fraud to various parties in a merger transaction. The accountants and lawyers were also alleged to have acted as aiders and
abettors for failing to report the fraud to the Commission. While the
district court did not endorse this extreme view,' 3 ° it did hold that the
lawyers aided and abetted the fraud' because they failed to inform
their own client at the closing that the merger could not go forward
until certain financial information was disclosed and approved by

shareholders.'1 2 The court did not decide whether a lawyer or an accountant who has knowledge of an imminent fraud has a duty to disclose the existence of such fraud to the Commission.
If aiding and abetting is no longer a viable theory, however, the
question becomes whether the lawyers in National Student Marketing

or the insurance company in Brennan engaged in a "manipulative or
deceptive practice." Failure to disclose has generally been held to con-

stitute a prohibited "manipulative or deceptive practice" only where a
defendant trades on confidential inside information without disclosure
to the opposing party to the transaction.' 33 Neither National Student
Marketing nor Brennan involved trading or the failure to disclose to an
writing a letter to the broker informing him that unless certain action were taken, the matter
would be referred to the Indiana Securities Commission. Id. at 152-53. Given the insignificant
nature of these "affirmative acts," the Court of Appeals opinion is in effect an endorsement of the
district court that the failure to report by itself could justify aiding and abetting liability. For cases
interpreting Brennan as an "inaction" case, see, e.g., IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 926-27 (2d Cir.
1980); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 889 (3d Cir. 1975); Woodward v. Metro Bank
of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 96 (5th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1317 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
128. See, e.g., Garrett, New Directionsin ProfessionalResonsibility, 29 Bus. LAW. 7 (Special
Issue 1974); Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals Under the FederalSecurities Laws--ame
Observations, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1973).
129. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 93,360 at 91,913-17 (D.D.C. 1972).
130. The court stated that failure to report the fraud until after the merger was consummated
did not substantially assist the merger and therefore could not constitute aiding and abetting. 457
F. Supp. at 712-14.
131. The case against the accountant defendants was settled by consent decree prior to trial.
Id. at 686-87 & nn.1-2.
132. I1d. at 713. It is unclear whether the court would have further required the lawyer defendants to disclose their knowledge of the fraud to the Commission or make other disclosures if
they had disclosed the information to their client, and the client chose to ignore it. Cf. note 127
supra (issuer's failure to report fraud).
133. See note 123 supra.
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opposing party. Rather, these cases involved the failure to disclose to
one's own client and/or to regulatory authorities. This failure to disclose fraud committed by others, whether or not unethical or in breach
of some other professional obligation,134 simply does not constitute a
securities violation because there has been no abuse of inside information or other failure to disclose despite a fiduciary duty to do so.
B.

LiabilityforProvidingSubstantialAssistance Despite
Knowledge of Fraud

Defendants, such as banks, that know of the existence of a fraud
but nevertheless provide substantial assistance toward its consumma1 35
tion, have been held liable as aiders and abettors under section 10(b).
The 36
recent Third Circuit case of Monsen v. ConsolidatedDressedBee/
Co.
is a good example of this trend.
In Monsen, Consolidated issued unsecured promissory notes to its
employees, which violated the registration and antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws. First Pennsylvania Bank was also alleged to
have violated section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 because of its role in the
illegal scheme. The bank was found to have known about the underlying securities violation but nevertheless demanded subordination of the
notes to its own secured loan and otherwise encouraged continuation of
the program. The Third Circuit held that the bank's knowledge of the
illegal note program, coupled with its insistence on the continuation
and subordination of the notes, satisfied the traditional requirements of
aiding and abetting-knowledge of the underlying violation and subtherefore, held the bank liable under section
stantial assistance-and,
37
10(b) and rule lOb-5.1
Mfonsen is illustrative of the general rule that banks will be held
liable under the section and the rule for aiding and abetting an offense
committed by a primary wrongdoer. The pioper question, however, is
134. On the relationship between the duty to disclose fraud and the traditional attorney-client
relationship, see Comment, Securities Lawn-Attorney'r Liability-Aiding and Abetting-SEC v.
NationalStudentMarketingCorp., 25 N.Y.L. REv. 79, 95-100 (1979), and authorities cited therein.
135. See note 15 supra.
136. 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1979).
137. There is some evidence that the Third Circuit may be changing its position. In Collins v.
Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1979), the court recognized the Supreme Court's emphasis
on statutory language and held that the language of § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976), forbidding fraud in the "offer or sale" of a security (see note 128 infra),
must be construed literally. Thus, the absence of a special relationship between the issuer and the
actual seller, which would have created privity between the plaintiff purchaser and the defendant
issuer, was held to preclude recovery under § 12(2). Although the court attempted to distinguish
Monsen, primarily on the ground that no claim of aiding and abetting liability was before it, 605
F.2d at 113-14, the literal approach of the court in Signetics is inconsistent with the complete
absence in Monsen of any attempt to reconcile liability with the statutory language.
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not whether the conduct of a bank-defendant satisfied the requirement
of the common law doctrines of aiding and abetting or conspiracy, but
whether the bank engaged in a "manipulative or deceptive" practice
within the meaning of section 10(b) as those terms have been interpreted by the Supreme Court. If a bank (such as the bank-defendant in
Monsen) has not engaged in any deception, Santa Fe compels the conclusion that it has not engaged in any conduct prohibited under section
10(b). It is only by improperly analyzing the question of liability by
reference to various common law doctrines that courts, such as the
Third Circuit in Monsen, have avoided this conclusion. Once the scope
of liability is determined by the language, structure, and history of the
statute, however, it necessarily follows that banks will not be liable
under13 8section 10(b) unless they engage in some form of deceptive conduct.
C. Liabilityfor Employing or Failingto Supervise
Primary Wrongdoers
Courts have frequently held that various types of defendants can
be liable under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 for employing or failing to
supervise primary wrongdoers on either an aiding and abetting or a
respondeat superior theory. 39 In SEC v. First Securities Co.,'40 for example, a brokerage firm was held liable for aiding and abetting under
the section and the rule because it allowed the wrongdoer to become
president of the firm and otherwise allowed the fraud to occur. Similarly, in MarburyManagement,Inc. v. Kohn, 4 ' the Second Circuit held
that a brokerage firm can be strictly liable under a respondeat superior
theory for employing an individual who commits a securities fraud
within the scope of his employment.
The imposition of liability for employing and/or failing to supervise a primary wrongdoer has not been limited to broker-dealers. In
Aaron v. SEC,4 2 for example, the Second Circuit held that a managerial employee charged with the supervision of sales by registered representatives was an aider and abettor because he failed to supervise and
otherwise prevent fraudulent practices from continuing. In Pettit v.
138. It could be argued that a bank which knowingly lent substantial assistance to a fraudulent scheme, but did not itself engage in a manipulative or deceptive practice, was nevertheless
liable as a "participant." For a criticism of the concept of participation liability, see notes 155-62
and accompanying text infra.
139. E.g., Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v. First Sec. Co.,
463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1972); Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135
(7th Cir. 1969); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
140. 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1972).
141. 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980).
142. 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded, 100 S.Ct. 1945 (1980).
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American Stock Exchange,143 the court held that a stock exchange
could be liable for aiding and abetting a fraud "by failing to take necessary disciplinary action" against some of its brokers who it knew or
should have known were engaged in fraudulent practices.
When these forms of conduct are analyzed in terms of the "manipulative or deceptive" language of section 10(b), however, a far different
picture emerges. A managerial employee who fails to supervise his
sales representatives adequately, even if he has reason to suspect
wrongdoing, has not himself engaged in any deceptive conduct in the
form of misrepresentations or trading on inside information without
disclosure and, therefore, has not engaged in any conduct prohibited by
section 10(b). A stock exchange that fails to police its member firms
properly similarly has committed no manipulative or deceptive practice
as those terms have been defined by the Supreme Court.'" A brokerdealer that does no more than employ an individual who engages in
prohibited conduct also has not itself engaged in a manipulative or
deceptive practice and certainly has not acted with scienter as required
by Hoch/elder. Only if these defendants are "controlling persons"
20(a) should they be liable under section 10(b) and rule
under Section
5
lOb-5.14
D. Liabilityfor the Transmission of InaccurateInformation
Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 prohibit the dissemination or transmission of materially inaccurate information to investors in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security, provided the defendant acts with
scienter. The question is whether this prohibition should extend to parties who are not the central actors in a fraudulent securities scheme.
Liability under the section and the rule has been imposed on accountants, for example, for knowingly preparing or certifying false and
misleading financial statements. 146 Courts have recognized that an accountant's act of certification is tantamount to a representation made
by a purchaser or seller of securities, since both acts are justifiably relied upon by investors. 4 7 Thus, in Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
143.
144.

217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
However, the stock exchange might violate § 6 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1975),

which requires that it adequately supervise its members.
145. A different situation is presented, however, in the case of a broker-dealer firm which
employs an agent who engages in a securities scheme which is known to its board of directors.
Since a firm can act only through its agents, the firm in the above hypothetical would be liable
under the federal securities laws. The scienter requirement is satisfied by the knowledge of the
board of director which is imputed to the firm. The resulting liability, however, is for a direct
violation of the statute, not for a violation based on a respondeat superior theory.
146. E.g., Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976);
McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976).
147. Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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Horwath & Horwath14 8 an accounting firm was held liable under rule
lOb-5 because of its knowing participation in the preparation and issuance of false and materially misleading accounting reports that an investor relied upon to his detriment. In Fischer v. Kletz, t49 the court
went further and held that an accountant has a duty under some circumstances to disclose to the public that its previously certified
financial report was false and misleading.
Attorneys, who also play a crucial role in the information transmission process, have similarly been penalized for making false statements. In both SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd. 150 and SEC v. Coven,15 1 for
example, the Second Circuit held that attorneys who prepared false
opinion letters which furthered an illegal securities scheme were aiders
and abettors.
Deceptive conduct by attorneys and accountants, whether previously analyzed as aiding and abetting or as a direct violation, should
continue to be prohibited by the section and the rule, provided the
other elements of liability, such as scienter i5 2 and the "in connection
with" requirement' 5 3 are satisfied. 15 4 Unlike the other forms of con-

duct discussed in preceding sections, the making of misrepresentations
which distort the transmission of accurate information is the core conduct which section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 are meant to deter. That such

misrepresentations are made by accountants or lawyers should not provide a shield from liability.
148. 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976).
149. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
150. 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
151. 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979).
152. The Supreme Court has expressly reserved the question of whether recklessness can constitute scienter. Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1950 n.5 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). The resolution of this issue will be highly significant in cases of accountant and attorney liability because these types of defendants frequently possess no intent to
defraud the plaintiff. For example, it is highly unlikely that an accounting firm's certification of
inaccurate financial statements resulting from an inadequate audit is attributable to a desire to
defraud investors.
153. Some cases involving alleged accountant liability have adopted extremely expansive interpretations of the "in connection with" requirement. E.g., Competitive Assoc., Inc. v. Laventol,
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that accountants who allegedly certified false and misleading financial statements of an investment fund managed by an
investment company in order to induce plaintiff to hire the investment company which then defrauded the plaintiff engaged in a deceptive practice in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security).
154. There is some possibility that certain types of misstatements will not be actionable under
the section and the rule even if all the criteria for liability are met. In Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), the Court indicated, without deciding, that there is evidence to
support the view that § 18(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976), was intended to be the
exclusive remedy for misstatements contained in any report prepared or certified by an accountant
filed with the Commission.
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E

A Note on Secondary Liability Under Other Provisions
of the Securities Laws

The vast majority of the secondary liability cases arise under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Defendants have also been held secondarily

liable, however, under other provisions of the securities acts. Two of
these situations are discussed briefly below.
1. Aiding andAbetting or Particoatingin a Violation of Section 12(2)
of the 1933 Act
Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act' 55 imposes liability upon a person

who makes misrepresentations in connection with offering or selling a
security. Several courts have faced the question of whether a defendant
can be liable as an aider and abettor under section 12(2) even though
such defendant never "offered or sold a security."' 5 6 While some
courts have interpreted the offer or sale language strictly, 157 other
courts have effectively disregarded the statutory language and have
held that defendants can be liable on an aiding and abetting158 or a
participation theory. 159
In In re Caesar'sPalaceSecurities Litigation,160 for example, the

court held that accountants could be liable under section 12(2) for misleading statements in connection with a sale of securities. Similarly,
155.
156.

15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act provides in relevant part:
Any person who:-(2) offers or sells a security.. . by means of a prospectus or oral communications,
which includes an untrue statement of material fact or omits to state a material fact
necessary inorder to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be

liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such

security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the
tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
157. E.g., Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1979); McFarland v. Memorex
Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Turner v. First Wis. Mortgage Trust, 454 F. Supp. 899
(E.D.. Wis. 1978); In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litigation, 416 F. Supp. 161 (C.D. Cal.
1976); duPont v. Wyly,61 F.R.D. 615 (D. Del. 1973); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp.
1089 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
158. E.g., Vogel v. Trahan, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,303
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 1980); In re Caesar's Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
159. E.g., Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978); Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411
F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969); Zachman v. Erwin, 186 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Tex. 1960); Wouneman v.
Stratford Sec. Co., [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 90,923 (S.D.N.Y.
1959). Other courts have approved the concept of participant liability if the participation is a
"substantial factor in causing the transaction to take place." Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709, 714
(5th Cir. 1980); Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1980).
160. 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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the court in Zachman v. Ervin 6 ' held that members of an advisory
board who participated in the fraudulent sale of a security by allowing
their names to be used in the selling effort could be liable under section
12(2).
Under the analysis proposed in this Article, Caesar's Palace,
Zachman, and-other cases endorsing the aiding and abetting or participation theories of liability under section 12(2) are wrongly decided.
The statutory language unambiguously limits liability to a "person who
offers or sells" a security. Moreover, the remedy provided in section
12(2)-rescission if the aggrieved buyer still owns the security or damages if he does not-strongly suggests that the remedy exists only
against the immediate seller. Courts should impose liability, therefore,
162
only on those in direct privity who actually "offer or sell" a security.
2. Aiding and Abetting a Violation of Section 17(a) of the 1934 Act
Section 17(a) of the 1934 Act 163 requires broker-dealers to file
certain financial reports with regulatory authorities. In Redington v.
Touche Ross & Co., " plaintiff, a customer of a brokerage firm, alleged
that an accounting firm was liable in damages for aiding and abetting a
violation of these reporting requirements. The district court dismissed
the complaint,'6 5 holding that section 17(a) imposes duties only on broker-dealers, and nowhere mentions any duties imposed upon accountants. The Second Circuit reversed,' 6 6 holding that accountants could
be liable under section 17(a) and that there was an implied private right
67
of action under the section. The Supreme Court again reversed,
holding that there is no implied private right of action under section
17(a). It did not reach the question of whether an accountant can be
liable under section 17(a).
If, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, the language of a
statute is dispositive where it is sufficiently clear, 68 accountants should
not be liable under section 17(a) for their role in preparing reports to
161. 186 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Tex. 1960).
162. In Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1979), the Third Circuit recognized that recent Supreme Court cases which have emphasized the importance of statutory language require that the "offer or sale" language in § 12(2) be interpreted literally. Thus, the
absence of privity between the plaintiff purchaser and a nonseller issuer defendant was held to
preclude recovery under § 12(2). See note 137 supra.

163. 18 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).
164. 428 F. Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 592 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1978), rey'd,442 U.S. 560
(1979).
165. Id.
166. 592 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1978).
167. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
168. E.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 422 U.S. 185, 201 (1976).
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the Commission. By its terms, section 17(a) imposes reporting requirements only upon broker-dealers and nowhere- mentions accountants.
Although the Supreme Court in Touche Ross no doubt was correct in
holding that Congress did not intend a private remedy under the section, an alternate, and possibly preferable,16 9 ground for decision
would have been to hold, as did the district court, that the accountant
had simply not engaged in any conduct prohibited by -the statute.
CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that recent Supreme Court decisions require questions of liability under the securities laws to be determined
by reference to the relevant statutory language, structure, and legislative history. Courts which have imposed secondary liability on aiding
and abetting, conspiracy, or respondeat superior theories have relied
upon none of these tools of statutory construction. Rather, these courts
have improperly incorporated various common law doctrines into the
securities laws without any attempt to reconcile the imposed liability
with the statutory language or its structure.
The proper inquiry, and, indeed, the only relevant inquiry, is
whether Congress intended to prohibit the challenged conduct in question. When congressional intent, as determined by the language, structure, and legislative history of a statute is used as the touchstone of
liability, the proper range of defendants subject to liability under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 contracts dramatically. Thus, various classes
of defendants who have previously been held to be secondarily liable,
such as lawyers or accountants who fail to "blow the whistle," employers who do no more than employ wrongdoers, and banks which knowingly finance a wrongdoer, should no longer be held liable since they
have not engaged in any conduct prohibited by the statute.
There no doubt will be some, and perhaps many, who will regard
the proposed approach as overly restrictive and insensitive to the needs
of unprotected investors. It must always be remembered, however, that
the primary responsibility for defining the scope of prohibited conduct
under a statute and the remedy for violations of such prohibitions rests
with Congress and not with the courts. While this principle is self-evident, courts have ignored it in implying a private right of action for
damages under section 10(b), rule lOb-5, and other securities laws, even
though Congress probably never intended such a result. This error
should not be compounded by continued recognition of the various
forms of secondary liability.

169.

See text accompanying note 81 supra.
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